In this paper we study job design. We first present a model posing two broad approaches to organizational optimization: centralized ex ante optimization, and decentralized continuous improvement. The model predicts complementarity between several job design attributes: multitasking, discretion, skills, and interdependence of tasks. Next we link this argument to characteristics of the firm and industry (e.g., product and technology, organizational change) to provide an explanation for observed patterns and trends in job design. We then use data on job design attributes to examine these issues. As predicted, job designs tend to be 'coherent' across these four dimensions. Job designs tend to follow similar patterns in the same firm, and especially in the same establishment. There is some evidence that firms may segregate different types of job design across different establishments.
Introduction
Job design is a fundamental issue in organizational design. Which tasks should be put together in the same job, what skills and training are needed, what decisions the employee should be allowed to make (or not), who the employee must work most closely with, and related questions are crucial for efficiency and innovation. These issues have long been a central focus in social psychology, which has a large literature on effects of job "enrichment" on intrinsic motivation. By contrast, job design has been under-emphasized in economics (with some notable exceptions, such as Adam Smith's discussion of specialization (1776)). For example, Lazear's wellknown "The Job as a Concept" (1992) treats the job as a promotion slot, part of an incentive system, etc., but makes little mention of job design issues. Holmstrom & Milgrom's (1991) multitask model treats a job as a performance measure. Neither agency theory or personnel economics yet has much to say about the actual design of a job.
Empirical evidence suggests that there are important patterns and trends in job design.
For example, conventional wisdom in the management research field and evidence from large organizations (Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Lawler, Mohrman & Benson, 2001 ) suggest a trend in recent decades toward the use of teams and human resource practices associated with job "enrichment"; i.e., multitasking instead of specialization, and greater employee discretion. In addition, this approach to job design seems to be positively associated with organizational change (Milgrom & Roberts 1990 , 1995 Caroli & Van Reenen 2001) . Finally, a substantial literature argues that organizational change in recent years has been skill-biased, leading to increasing returns to skills and a greater emphasis on higher-skilled workers in firms that have undergone change (Autor, Katz & Krueger 1998; Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson & Hitt 1999; Autor, Levy & Murname 2001; Zoghi & Pabilonia 2004) .
In this paper, we present an economic analysis of job design. We first develop a model based on a simple idea: giving the worker multiple (interdependent) tasks may enable the worker to learn improvements on the job. If this effect is important enough, it may dominate the gains from specialization, leading to multitasking. This learning can be stronger if the worker has higher skills, and if the worker is given discretion. Thus, the model predicts that if interdependence in production is higher, jobs are more likely to be multitask, with greater worker discretion and skills.
We then consider the causes of intertask learning. If the firm is able to optimize methods ex ante (historically, such an approach has often been called "scientific engineering" or "Taylorism"), there is little scope for the worker to learn, and specialization is likely to dominate multitasking. On the other hand, when investments in ex ante optimization do not have high returns, firms may instead adopt more of a continuous improvement approach, designing jobs to optimize worker learning. Similarly, firms may opt for more multitasking and decentralization if undergoing organizational change, since there may be much scope for workers to learn and implement new methods. Therefore, job design should be related to the characteristics of the firm's product, industry, and technology. This should lead to patterns of job design within firms, and within establishments in the same firm. This argument can also explain recent trends toward broader job design and greater worker discretion, and the association of certain job design attributes with organizational change.
The second part of the paper analyzes a unique, nationally representative dataset containing information on job design characteristics. The BLS National Compensation Survey asks a series of questions about job design attributes, including indicators for multitasking, discretion (supervision and guidelines), skills, and interdependence. As predicted, we find that all four job design attributes are strongly positively correlated. There is a tendency for firms to choose either a "modern" approach (high on all job design dimensions) or a "classical" approach (low on all job design dimensions) at the establishment level, but not both. This is consistent with our arguments that job design approaches vary with the firm's product and market characteristics. At the firm level, there is a tendency to push job design toward the extremes, choosing modern job design in some establishments and classical job design in others. This is consistent with multiestablishment firms using establishments to isolate modern and classical jobs from each other to capture the benefits of job design while minimizing the potential downsides from mixing different designs.
A Theory of Job Design
We now present a simple theory of job design (based on Lindbeck & Snower (2000) and Gibbs & Levenson (2002) ; also see Dessein & Santos (2004) for similar ideas). There are two tasks, and output X i from both is combined to create total output:
where α > 0 reflects comparative advantage of the tasks in producing output.
Output on each task depends on the fraction of the worker's time allocated to that task (τ for the first task, 1-τ for the second). If the worker performs both tasks, it also depends on the extent of intertask learning: in performing one task, the worker improves output on the other. This is the crucial idea in the model. For example, a worker who performs both tasks may be more likely to spot problems in how output from the two tasks fits together (a type of coordination problem), leading to lower costs or better quality. Doing both may help the worker to better understand what to emphasize in performing each task. Finally, exposing a worker to a broader set of tasks may lead to more innovation and creativity. Using the familiar example of academia, most universities are organized to combine teaching and research, because in most cases working on each improves work on the other. Moreover, interdisciplinary research is often encouraged because it tends to lead to more creative new research topics.
The extent to which output improves on the other task is proportional to the time spent on the first task:
where s = the marginal product of time spent on each task, and k = the degree of intertask learning. The learning effects are not as strong as the direct effects, s > k.
Workers have skills (innate ability or human capital) h. It is natural to assume that intertask learning is stronger for more skilled workers: k = k(h), dk/dh > 0.
Consider two cases of how to design jobs for two identical workers. The first is specialization: each task is assigned to a different worker. The second is multitask jobs: each task is assigned to both workers, and output is the sum of the outputs Q i for each. As in Becker & Murphy (1992) , there are coordination costs C if workers are specialized, but none if workers have multitask jobs.
a. Specialized Jobs
In this case, one worker focuses on task 1 (sets τ = 1); the other focuses on task 2 (sets τ = 0). Their work is then combined (with no intertask learning) to make total output; a simple example might be an assembly line. Thus,
Since output is multiplicative in X 1 and X 2 , there are gains from specialization, as τ can be set to 0 or 1 rather than forcing a convex combination of time on each task. However, these are offset by coordination costs. If workers specialize, there are no gains from intertask learning.
b. Multitask Jobs
In this case each worker devotes time to both tasks. Output for worker i is:
τ is chosen (by the firm, or by the worker if there is discretion as discussed below) to optimize Q i for each worker:
For there to be multitask jobs with τ ∈ (0,1), α cannot be too different from 1 in either direction (so that s-αk > 0, and sα-k > 0). In other words, comparative advantage cannot be too strong.
Thus we should expect to see multitask jobs only in cases where the relative marginal product of tasks is not too divergent.
Given these allocations of time between the two tasks, output of an individual worker is given by substituting τ * and 1-τ * into Q i above. Total output is twice this for two multitasking workers:
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For example, if k = 0 and α = 1, then Q multitask = ½·s², and Q specialized = s² -C, which will be greater than Q multitask as long as C is not too large. Comparing (1) and (2), as α diverges from 1 in either direction, specialization is more likely to be the best design, in order to better exploit comparative advantages.
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The effects of marginal product s are also ambiguous. Higher marginal product of τ increases output for both specialized and multitask jobs. The elasticity of output with respect to s in each case is:
If k > 0 (the only reason for multitask jobs), output is more elastic with respect to s for specialized jobs. This means that even if multitask jobs are optimal for some range, as s gets very large specialization becomes more likely. Thus, the model does not make a prediction about the incidence of multitasking across hierarchical levels. Empirically, it seems clear that multitasking is more important at higher levels in most firms. If so, this must be for other reasons. One might be the increasing importance of coordination at higher levels in a hierarchical production function, which is beyond the scope of this model.
We now turn to our first, and most important, result that will guide the empirical work: multitask jobs are more likely to be optimal, the more important is intertask learning:
The result is obvious by inspection of (1) and (2). This is our core argument: multitask jobs imply that workers are more likely to see how different parts of the process fit together. This will often improve the worker's ability to do both tasks, leading to continuous improvements and in-novations. Thus, production processes that are more complex (in the sense of greater interdependence between tasks) are more likely to use multitask jobs. For workers to learn on the job, multitasking is important since interdependencies between tasks are an important source of inefficiencies in production, and one that is exacerbated by specialization. Thus, the degree of specialization is limited not just by coordination costs (Becker & Murphy 1992) , but also by the extent of opportunities for intertask learning.
c. The Role of Skills
More highly-skilled workers will be better able to learn on the job, and exploit their insights to improve production. This idea is captured in our second important result: multitask jobs are more likely to be optimal, the higher the skills of the worker. Since dk/dh > 0, this follows immediately from (1) and (2). Returns to skills will be higher in more complex work environments, where the scope for intertask learning by the worker is higher. Similarly, lower skills will be more appropriate for specialized jobs.
d. The Role of Discretion
Another important job design characteristic is the degree of discretion (decentralization) given to an employee (Ortega 2004) . If the employee is learning in a multitask job, discretion can play an important role by allowing the worker to test ideas about causes of problems and new methods of production, and implement their good ideas (Jensen & Wruck 1994) . Suppose, for example, that the production environment k (or s, k/s, or α) is stochastic, and ex ante the firm only knows the distribution of k but not its specific value. If workers perform both tasks (but not ences in productivity (α) across the two tasks. Our goal is to demonstrate factors that might tip the scale toward using multitask if specialized), they observe the state of the world before choosing their allocation of time τ. Intuitively, performing both tasks allows the worker to observe in real time the relative value of focusing on one task or devoting time to both. If the worker is given discretion, he or she can choose τ conditional on the state of the world, though at some agency cost D.
2 Otherwise, the firm chooses τ without this knowledge. Using the worker's knowledge can improve output:
Proof: Q multitask | centralization = argmax τ [E(Q)] = expected output with τ chosen over the entire distribution of the unknown state of the world. Q multitask | discretion = argmax τ [Q | state of the world].
Clearly, the τ chosen to maximize expected output can result in actual output no better than the τ chosen to maximize output when the state of the world is known. If these benefits outweigh the agency costs D, a multitask worker will be given discretion.
Moreover, discretion will tend to be more valuable, the more uncertain is the production environment. From (2), Q is convex in s, k, s/k, and α. Therefore, expected output will be higher, when variance in any of these parameters can be exploited by the worker, than output when there is no variance in the parameters (by Jensen's inequality). Unfortunately, solving for the optimal time allocation τ * when production is stochastic does not yield closed form solutions, even for simple cases (e.g., binary k or α). However, putting together these ideas and the special case in (4) above, it seems reasonable to predict that discretion is complementary with multitasking, especially in more uncertain environments.
jobs, so we ignore this extension. 2 Our goal here is not to model agency costs, so we assume the simplest form. One might extend the argument to predict that worker incentives will be complementary with discretion (Ortega 2004 ). Dessein & Santos (2004) consider this possibility, and
More generally, we might model the worker receiving an imperfect signal about k (or k/s), but with greater precision than the firm; a similar result should follow. In that case, a natural extension would be to assume that the precision of the signal is an increasing function of the worker's skill h. If so, skills and discretion would be directly complementary. In the simpler case, they are complements with each other because both are complements with multitask jobs when there is intertask learning.
In any case, the story fits together nicely: multitasking allows the worker to see interdependencies between tasks, so the worker is more innovative or learns ways to improve output on one or both tasks. These effects only matter if intertask learning is important. We can interpret k (or k/s) as a measure of the degree of task interdependence, or the extent to which doing both tasks provides learning opportunities on the job. Thus, environments with greater interdependence between tasks are more likely to see multitask jobs, etc. If production is stochastic, the multitasking worker may have better information about the state of intertask learning or comparative advantage than management. Such worker knowledge arises from multitasking, but not from specialization, because it involves the relative returns to allocating effort across multiple tasks.
Discretion allows the worker to change emphasis dynamically, exploiting this knowledge to better balance comparative advantage or the returns to specialization versus intertask learning.
Higher skills may reinforce learning on the job, and observing the state of nature. Putting these all together yields our first empirical prediction:
1. There will be positive relationships between the degree of multitasking, discretion, employee skills, and interdependence.
show that increasing agency costs with greater discretion may make the relationship between multitasking and interdependence non-monotonic. Our data do not contain information on compensation policies so we ignore that possibility.
In a nutshell, our story is that "modern" job design emphasizes decentralized, continuous improvement by skilled workers with multitasked jobs, while "classical" job design emphasizes centralized, ex ante optimization, resulting in specialization, low discretion, and low skills. If opportunities for learning on the job are large enough, the balance may tip toward multitasking, etc.
Thus, factors leading to greater intertask learning k will affect the firm's approach to job design.
This idea leads to the next sub-section.
e. Relationship to Intrinsic Motivation
The predictions to this point are remarkably similar to those from the social psychology literature on intrinsic motivation. For example, the most well-known versions of this work (Hackman & Lawler 1971; Hackman & Oldham 1976) argue that task or skill variety drive intrinsic motivation, because the job is more intellectually challenging to the worker. Indeed, Adam
Smith recognized that a cost to specialization is that workers may find the work boring, and thus be less motivated. This tends to lead, in practice, to multitask jobs. It also advocates "autonomy"
and "feedback," which essentially amount to giving the employee discretion (and providing information to the employee on the effects of decisions). However, multitasking and discretion arise in the model in this paper from a different mechanism, intertask learning, and require no assumptions about worker psychology.
The model can easily accommodate intrinsic motivation. If the marginal disutility of effort is lower when the worker performs both tasks, this would yield an additional benefit to multitasking: the wage could be lower than for otherwise comparable specialized jobs. Equivalently, intrinsic motivation could be modeled as increasing coordination costs C of specialization, since we suppress wages in our analysis.
However, we purposely do not consider intrinsic motivation. Although we believe that many workers are intrinsically motivated by multitask jobs, the intertask learning mechanism should hold regardless of any psychological effects, and is nicely complementary with the psychological explanation. The psychology story implies that multitask jobs will increase the extent to which workers are intellectually engaged in their work: thinking and curious about what they are doing. If so, this should only increase the degree of intertask learning.
f. The Role of Product, Technology, and Other Firm Characteristics
Consider ex ante optimization of production methods as an investment. When the return on this investment is higher, there should be more scientific engineering, specialization, etc. The return on ex ante optimization depends on the degree to which it uncovers methods that are close to the optimum, and the extent to which the efficiency gains are expected to be reaped in the future. These depend on the nature of the firm's product and environment: its complexity, predictability, and stability.
The first relevant characteristic of the product or process is complexity. Those that are more complex (e.g., more parts; modules in a software program; broader product line) are more difficult to perfect ex ante. The cost of optimizing the manufacture of a tin can (less than half a dozen parts) is substantially lower than optimizing the manufacture of a diesel engine (2000 or more parts). Moreover, in the diesel engine, the parts have to work together well -there is a high degree of interdependency. Such interdependencies tend to be the kind of situations where ex ante optimization is more difficult, quality problems arise, etc.
A second important characteristic of the product or process is the extent to which it is unpredictable. Consider management consulting. Each client engagement is different from those that came before. Some processes and methods can be reapplied, but new methods or applica-tions often need to be developed. Moreover, judgment as to what methods to apply may be required. To the extent that situations arise over and over, the consulting firm may be able to develop standard methods, and provide employees with a menu of choices from which to select.
However, if any of the work is idiosyncratic and unforeseeable, some optimization will have to occur in real time.
A third important product or process characteristic is the degree of stability of over time.
This plays out both backward and forward in time. The longer that a product has been produced with few or no changes, the more that is known about how to make it efficiently. The longer the firm expects to make the same product (the less it is expected to evolve), the greater the expected returns on ex ante optimization. Thus, stability should lead to greater investments in ex ante optimization.
All of these factors (complexity and interdependence, predictability, and stability) influence the return on investments in ex ante optimization of methods. If the return is small, the firm will invest less in ex ante optimization, and there are greater possibilities for employees to engage in continuous improvement. Continuous improvement is more likely to be successful with a "modern" approach to job design. These ideas help explain patterns of job design across industries and occupations. Work environments within industries and occupations will have similar complexity, predictability, and stability; thus, job designs should be more similar within industries and occupations than across the economy as a whole.
This logic can also explain the recent trend toward "modern" jobs, and the association of "modern" jobs with organizational change (Caroli & Van Reenen 2001) . The last few decades have exhibited increasingly rapid change, due to modern manufacturing and flexible production methods, information technology and technological change, shorter product cycles, and increas-ing emphasis on customization and complex product lines (Milgrom & Roberts 1990 , 1995 . All reduce the returns from investing in industrial engineering, and increase the returns to continuous improvement. When an organization is changing, there will be much more scope for workers to develop improvements (and aid implementation of change), because old methods are less likely to be optimal.
Thus, industry factors should affect the correlations between multitasking, discretion, skills, and interdependence. Ideally we would like independent measures of the nature of the product and rate of technological evolution to test the hypotheses directly. Unfortunately, our dataset contains no such measures. Industry classifications provide a second best way of identifying differences in product and technology characteristics, so in the empirical work below we discuss the effects of industries and occupations on job design.
2. Firms will tend toward choosing a "pure" job design approach (i.e., applying one job design approach to all jobs) within the organization.
In practice this means that we expect a clustering of high levels of multitasking, discretion, skills, and interdependence among occupations within some firms, medium levels at other firms, and low levels at still other firms. Note though that high, medium, and low are relative terms. The prediction is about multitasking, etc. relative to their occupational norms. In social psychology, Porter, Lawler and Hackman (1975) make a similar assertion. This prediction is also consistent with the recent emphasis in organizational economics on complementarities between policies (Milgrom & Roberts 1990 , 1995 Ichniowski, Shaw & Prennushi 1997) .
Such patterns should be stronger within establishments than within firms as a whole. At a naive level, product attributes are likely to be more similar within establishments than across the entire firm. Less naively, establishments are groupings of employees chosen by the firm. Since workers are grouped together by choice, it is more likely that the products, customers, technology, etc. that they work with are the same as (or similar to) those of colleagues in the same establishment, compared to two employees randomly chosen from the same firm but different establishments. Moreover, workers are put together at a site when their work is highly interdependent, establishments can in a sense be viewed as teams. If their work is interdependent, then it is even more likely that product and technology attributes will affect them similarly. Thus, we predict that:
3. The tendency toward choosing a "pure" job design should be stronger at the establishment level than at the firm level.
We now turn to a description of the data that we employ to test these ideas.
Data
Our empirical analyses use a novel dataset that contains information on job design from a nationally-representative sample of establishments in the U.S. The dataset is the National Compensation Survey (NCS), a restricted-use dataset collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. It covers the non-agricultural, non-federal sectors of the US economy. Our data are from 1999. The NCS collects data on several "leveling factors," described below, which are intended to measure various job design attributes. To collect the data, field economists visited sampled establishments and interviewed human resource representatives. Workers were randomly chosen for analysis from the site's personnel list (without replacement). Thus, there can be multiple observations from different employees in the same job. Data were collected on 5-20 different jobs at each establishment, depending on establishment size.
In addition to the leveling factors, the dataset includes information on occupation of each job, industry, whether the establishment is privately owned or public (state or local government), and union status of the job. It also includes earnings data, and an indicator for use of incentive pay. No demographic information about the worker is collected. The NCS data has not been studied extensively. For analyses using the data, see Pierce (1999) Here we provide a brief synopsis of the ones we use, and how they correspond to the concepts from our theoretical discussion. All are measured on Likert scales with ranges varying from 1-3 to 1-9.
Knowledge:
This measure is quite similar to the general notion of human capital. 1-3 correspond roughly to blue collar levels of skills. 4 is at the level of an apprenticeship. 5 is at the level of a college graduate, and so on. Thus, larger values imply greater Knowledge. This factor corresponds quite well to our Skills job design attribute.
Supervision Received:
Larger values correspond to less Supervision. Values of 1-2 roughly correspond to below management. 3 implies some management. 4-5 increase management and reduce monitoring. This factor corresponds to some dimensions of Discretion in our discussion above. We use it, along with the next factor, to proxy for that concept.
Guidelines:
As with Supervision Received, larger numbers correspond to less use of Guidelines. Guidelines measures the extent to which standard procedures, etc., are used in the job. Lack of them, of course, would indicate greater Discretion. Thus, we interpret both Supervi-sion Received and Guidelines as indicators of (positively correlated with) our concept of Discretion.
Complexity:
Roughly speaking, Complexity measures two things: the extent to which the job has multiple dimensions; and the extent to which the job has unpredictability. The former
is closer to what we mean by multitasking as the opposite of specialization, though unpredictability also suggests variation in tasks. Moreover, Complexity is positively associated with interrelationships between tasks. In our discussion of job enrichment, we argued that an important reason for enrichment is to design jobs so that employees see complex interactions between complementary tasks. Thus, the NCS Complexity corresponds reasonably well, to our concept of Multitasking.
Scope & Effect:
Scope & Effect measures the extent to which the employee's job has impacts on others in (and beyond) the organization. As Scope & Effect gets larger, the impacts get larger. Thus, this measures the interdependence of a job with jobs of co-workers and customers, rather than interdependence between tasks within the same job. However, it seems likely that greater interdependence between jobs will be positively correlated with greater interdependence between tasks within jobs, since it indicates that overall interdependence is higher. Thus, we interpret this as a proxy for Interdependence, though it is the leveling factor that corresponds least well to the model's theoretical concepts. Since our empirical analyses study positive correlations between all four job design characteristics, even if we dropped our measure of Interdependence from the analyses, our conclusions would be essentially the same for the other factors. Table 1 shows the Spearman rank-order correlations between the five factors. The correlations are high, consistent with our first prediction that there should be positive relationships between multitasking, discretion, skills, and interdependence across jobs. In all of the models in the top panel of Table 2 presents strong evidence consistent with the first prediction.
Results

a. Bivariate Relationships Between Job Characteristics
In addition to the results for the full sample at the top of Table 2 , the results for the non- Table A1 : the correlations increase substantially for the non-managerial sample while they remain largely unchanged in the managerial sample. Thus the results for all managerial jobs without 3 digit occupation controls are similar to the results for all nonmanagerial jobs when controlling for differences across 3 digit occupations. This means that empirically the relationships among job design characteristics for managerial jobs look very similar 3 We use the 1990 U.S. Census 3-digit industry and occupation codes.
to the same relationships for all other jobs when controlling for between-occupation differences:
the theory applies equally well to managerial and non-managerial jobs.
Why do the positive relationships between Skills and three of the other four factors (Multitasking; Discretion (Guidelines and Supervision)) become much larger when controlling for between-occupation differences? If the theory only explains broad differences across occupations in knowledge (e.g., comparing chemical engineers and truck drivers), then controlling for occupational differences should greatly reduce the positive correlation among knowledge and the other factors.
On the other hand, "skill" is not a unidimensional characteristic. The model posits that multitask jobs with greater discretion work best when paired with "higher skilled" workers, but what constitutes high levels of skill? The ability to synthesize chemical compounds in a laboratory represents a higher level of skill than the ability to drive a car, if one equates scarceness with level of skill. This scarcity feature of skill is incorporated in the knowledge factor in the NCS data. For example, the first level of the knowledge factor encompasses "knowledge of simple, routine, or repetitive tasks," while the sixth level encompasses "knowledge of the principles, concepts, and methodology of a professional or administrative occupation." Thus a job requiring chemical engineering skills should be rated more highly on the knowledge dimension than a job that requires the ability to drive a car.
While in this sense chemical engineering skills may represent a "higher" level of skill, the real issue is whether greater complexity and/or discretion should be accompanied by greater ability to perform along a uniform dimension of skill, because occupations represent unique groupings of skills. UPS truck drivers are given very little discretion in how to approach the task of driving (Vogel & Hawkins 1990 ), which implies that the level of driving ability should be low relative to other jobs that involve a lot of driving. Race car drivers, in contrast, have much more discretion in deciding how to operate their vehicles. Not coincidentally, such jobs require the highest level of driving skill, a necessity for the highly complex conditions on a race track, which include extremely high speeds and heavy traffic.
Similarly, machine operators in a chemical manufacturing facility are better suited to perform their tasks well if they understand basic chemical engineering principles. This allows them to identify problems before they become catastrophic and take appropriate steps to rectify them.
Scientists who synthesize new compounds in the laboratory, in contrast, have much more complex jobs, which also require higher level chemical engineering skills at Masters or Ph.D. level.
These two examples illustrate the importance of minimizing the extent to which the knowledge factor represents scarcity comparisons across skill type (e.g., driving vs. chemical engineering) while maximizing the extent to which it represents scarcity comparisons within skill type (e.g., low vs. high driving skills; low vs. high chemical engineering skills). This is what the within-occupation estimates measure. Thus, the fact that the positive relationships between the knowledge factor and the other job design characteristics (complexity; guidelines; supervision) are stronger when controlling for differences across occupations is strong evidence in favor of the predictions.
The fact that the evidence supports the theory for managerial samples as well as nonmanagerial, and that the relationships are stronger when controlling for occupations, is particularly noteworthy in light of previous empirical evidence. The examples studied most often come from manufacturing, and are closely tied into the discussion in recent years of the impact of human resource practices on productivity and profitability (Huselid 1995 
b. Multivariate Relationships Between Job Characteristics
The results in Tables 2 and A1 provide weak evidence that firms choose between classical and modern job design. A stronger test focuses on the extent to which they cluster together as a group so that job designs are "coherent" -all high, all medium, or all low. To address this question we first center the values for each job around the median for each three digit occupation, in Table 3 . This allows us to consider a job as high, medium or low along each dimension, relative to its peers. The distribution above and below the occupation-specific median is in the top half of Table 3 . In the bottom half of Table 3 we assign values of 1, 2 and 3, respectively, to values below, at, and above the median for Knowledge, Discretion (Guidelines), 5 Multitasking and Interdependence, and call the resulting variable "MV."
In Table 4 a new variable is constructed: the index (sum) of MV for each of the four job characteristics, ranging in value from 4-12. Column 2 in Table 4 were randomly distributed within each job. This is strong evidence for the theory.
In addition, note that one quarter of all jobs fall into the all-medium MV values category. This is an extremely large percentage relative to what we would expect from random assignment (0.87%, third column). While much of the prior literature, especially in social psychology, has focused on the extremes (all low and all high), clustering of median values is further evidence supporting our theoretical arguments.
c. Similarity of Job Designs Within Firms and Establishments
We now turn to analysis of our second and third predictions, that job designs will tend to be similar within firms, and even more so within establishments. For predictions 2 and 3, the relevant comparison for a job is not to all other jobs in the economy, but to other jobs in the same establishment or firm. Our approach is to use probits to estimate the probability that a job is "all modern" (index = 12) or "all classical" (index = 4), as a function of the composition of other jobs in the establishment or firm. For regressors, we use the percentages of other jobs in the establishment or firm that fall into each unique MV category for the four job characteristics. For ease of interpretation, Table 5a reports the results when all jobs with common index values are grouped together. For example, the "3L, 1M" group includes four subgroups: LLLM, LLML, LMLL and MLLL. For sake of comparison, Appendix Table A2 contains the results when all 81 unique categories are entered separately; the results are broadly the same, so we focus the discussion on the results in Table 5a , which are easier to interpret.
For the firm variables, the percentages are calculated using the jobs at other establishments in the same firm, excluding jobs at the same establishment. Thus firms with only one establishment are excluded from the analysis in Table 5a . The first two sets of columns contain the results from estimating the probability of a LLLL job, both with and without 3 digit industry controls. The second sets of columns contain the results from estimating the probability of a HHHH job.
The results in Table 5a are strongly consistent with the second prediction. As expected, the probability of an LLLL job is positively correlated with the percentage of other jobs in the establishment that are LLLL (first row). It is negatively correlated with the percentage of other jobs in the establishment that are HHHH (last row). Similarly, the probability of an HHHH job is positively correlated with the percentage of other jobs in the establishment that are HHHH, and negatively correlated with the percentage of other jobs in the establishment that are LLLL. There are similar positive, but smaller, correlations between pr(LLLL) and many of the jobs that are "almost all" classical (3L, 1M) and "mostly classical" (2L, 2M; 1L, 3M). The opposite is true for pr(HHHH) and jobs that are almost (3H, 1M) or mostly (2H, 2M; 1H, 3M) modern. Establish-ment jobs that mix both high and low characteristics (3L, 1H; 2L, 2H; 1L, 2M, 1H; etc.) are much less likely to be positively correlated to either pr(LLLL) or pr(HHHH): none of those coefficients have p-values < 0.05. The clear pattern is that firms tend to choose pure job design approaches, opting for most or all jobs to be either high on all dimensions, or low on all dimensions. This is consistent with prediction 2. To a lesser degree firms make the same choice across establishments, consistent with prediction 3.
Two additional patterns are worth noting in Table 5a . First, when predicting the probability of an LLLL job with no industry controls (first set of columns), the fraction of other jobs in the establishment that are HHHH is negatively correlated. In contrast, the fraction of other jobs in the firm, but in different establishments, that are HHHH is positively correlated. This suggests that firms both isolate similar jobs in the same establishment (the within-establishment results), and that firms that make greater use of LLLL jobs also make greater use of HHHH jobs. Such firms push the design of jobs toward the two extremes and away from the middle of the distribution. The fact that this pattern disappears when controlling for industry differences means that such firms are concentrated in some industries and not others. Thus this job design pattern varies systematically by industry, likely related to differences in product, technology and/or organizational change.
Second, some of the within-establishment correlations get stronger when controlling for industry fixed effects. Specifically, when predicting Pr(LLLL) both coefficients on the fraction of jobs that are HHHH and (3H, 1M) get more negative; and when predicting Pr(HHHH) both coefficients on the fraction of jobs that are LLLL and (3L, 1M) get more negative. This means that the tendency for firms to segregate HHHH and LLLL jobs across establishments (within the same firm) is consistent across industries, though the tendency is not uniform, being more prevalent in certain industries.
The changes in estimates when controlling for industry fixed effects is worth noting for another reason: response bias. One concern about the way the data is collected is that only one person per establishment provides all the responses for the survey. Thus a bias by some respondents toward overrating or underrating leveling factors for all jobs in the establishment could lead to spurious correlations of job design within establishments. We would expect, however, that such biases would be random across individuals, and would not vary systematically across industries. The fact that adding industry fixed effects causes some correlations to increase and others to decrease argues against response bias causing the observed positive correlations among job design attributes.
6 Table 5b presents the results from predicting Pr(MMMM), using the same set of regressors as Table 5a . As expected, the probability that a job will be MMMM is strongly correlated with the presence of similar "all medium" jobs in both the establishment and in the firm, with stronger within-establishment than within-firm correlations.
Similar to Table 5a, Table 5b also shows a within-firm, across-establishment segregation of dissimilar jobs. In the case of "medium" jobs in Table 5b , the segregation occurs for jobs that are only slightly different. For example, the greater the fraction of (1H, 3M) jobs in the rest of the firm, the lower the probability of a MMMM job in the same establishment. Note that the within-establishment correlations for the "close to medium jobs" (3L, 1M through 3H, 1M) be-come weaker when controlling for industry fixed effects. In contrast, the within-firm, across establishment correlations for those same jobs become stronger when controlling for industry fixed effects. For example, when not controlling for industry fixed effects, the coefficient on (2L, 2M) in the rest of the firm is -0.541 (second column), which increases to -0.793 when industry controls are added (fourth column). As with some of the patterns in Table 5a , this indicates that this job design pattern is consistent across industries. Table 6 presents the coefficients from the other variables included in the models in Table   A2 (columns one, two, five and six in the table). In addition, the same coefficients are reported from a version of the Table A2 specification that controls for firm effects and for establishment effects. The variables included whether the establishment is in the nonprofit sector, whether the job is unionized, and establishment size.
d. Effects of Other Factors on Job Characteristics
Establishments that are in the non-profit sector are less likely to have LLLL job designs, even when controlling for industry differences. They also are no more likely to have HHHH job designs than for-profit establishments. This perhaps is not surprising given non-profits' missions;
jobs that are specialized with low discretion are sometimes criticized by unions and others as not being "worker-friendly." Nonprofits may trade-off financial benefits from adopting such job designs in favor of job designs that do not carry the same potential stigma. Similarly, if multitask jobs with more discretion generate more intrinsic motivation, as argued in the social psychology literature, non-profits may be more likely to adopt such designs because of infeasibility of using pay for performance to motivate their employees.
7
Unionized jobs are much less likely to be both LLLL and HHHH. The former is consistent with unions' traditional negative views of LLLL job design. The latter is consistent with the conventional wisdom that unions are resistant to change, and to wider differences in compensation among members. Modern job design has potential benefits to employees in the guise of upgraded skills and potentially higher wages, possibly increasing the returns to skills. But making that change can threaten the probability that existing union workers will keep their jobs, and might widen the dispersion in earnings among members. Note, though, that the negative correlation of unionization and HHHH jobs exists only when controlling for firm or establishment differences. This means that more-unionized industries are just as likely to use HHHH jobs (though they are less likely to use LLLL jobs). The impact of unions on job design instead is seen only when comparing firms within the same industry, and establishments within the same firm.
Finally, there is a positive relationship between establishment size and choosing both HHHH and LLLL job design. For LLLL jobs, the difference exists only across firms -the coefficients on the establishment size quadratic are not significantly different from zero in the withinfirm model (third column of Table 8 ). For HHHH jobs, the difference exists both across and within firms, but adding firm controls (seventh column of Table 8 ) greatly reduces the correlation. Thus, much of the relationship between establishment size and job design choice is explained by between-firm differences. Within the same firm there is much greater uniformity of 7 One criticism of the empirical findings might be that they are driven not by intertask learning, but instead by firms designing jobs to generate intrinsic motivation as in the social psychology literature. However, the fact that job design patterns vary systematically across different industries suggest that product or industry characteristics play a role, which is strong evidence in favour of the intertask learning explanation. Of course, it is most likely that both mechanisms play a role.
job design choice across establishments. This could be viewed as establishment uniformity limiting the choice of job design (for technological and product design reasons) -a type of range restriction in the estimation. Alternatively, it could be viewed as further evidence of the relevance of job design theory, in that firms tend to use similar job designs for all their establishments.
Conclusions
In this paper we presented a simply theory of job design that can explain observed trends and patterns in the empirical literature. We posed two rough approaches to organizational design (not just to job design, though that is the focus here). In the first approach, the firm uses ex ante optimization of methods. As a result workers are given relatively narrow jobs to exploit gains from specialization and comparative advantage, low discretion, and have relatively low skills.
However, ex ante optimization is not always feasible or profitable. When the firm faces greater complexity, unpredictability, or instability, it is less likely to effectively optimize production ex ante. If so, then there is potential for the worker to learn on the job and engage in continuous improvement.
We argued that task interdependence is an important source of both costs of ex ante optimization, and of on-the-job learning. Thus, an alternative to ex ante optimization is continuous improvement, giving workers multitask jobs to develop intertask learning. Higher worker skills and greater discretion are complements to this approach, since they facilitate develop of new ideas, as well as implementation of improvements. Thus, the theory predicts that multitasking, interdependence, discretion, and skills will be positively correlated in the same job. Since the emphasis on ex ante optimization or continuous improvement depends on the firm's complexity, unpredictability, and stability, the firm's product, technology, and industry characteristics should be important factors influencing job design. Finally, this logic implies that there should be patterns of similar job design within firms, and even more so within establishments.
We then analyzed data on job design attributes, using reasonable proxies for our concepts of multitasking, discretion, skills, and interdependence. The results are strongly consistent with our predictions. All four job design attributes are strongly positively correlated. There is a tendency for firms to choose either a modern job design approach -high on all four job design characteristics -or a classical job design approach -low on all four, but not both (at the establishment level). This is consistent with our argument that job design approaches vary with the firm's product and market characteristics. At the firm level, in contrast, there is a tendency to push job design toward extremes, choosing modern job design in some establishments and classical job design in others. This is consistent with multi-establishment firms using establishments to isolate different types of jobs (and overall organizational design emphasis on centralized, ex ante v. decentralized, continuous optimization) from each other to capture the benefits of job design while minimizing the potential downsides from doing so.
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